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学术讲座:Timely Persuation

题目:Timely Persuation
报告人:周臻 (清华大学五道口金融学院教授)
报告时间:2018年11月28日(周三) 14:00 pm
地点:国际经管学院会议室(诚明楼三层)
主办方:国际经济管理学院


摘要:Upon arrival of a shock, agents get a short time window to exit. There is strategic complementarity in exiting while delayed exiting is costly. The arrival of the shock is publicly known but agents do not know the intensity of it perfectly. This could generate a panic - the agents choosing to exit even when the fundamental is not extremely bad (under which all agents should exit). There is a principal who, unlike the agents, can see the intensity of the shock and how many agents are exiting. To minimize the incidence of panic, what information should she disclose? We propose a simple information disclosure policy. At some date, the principal publicly sends a disaster alert that confirms whether exiting has become the dominant strategy or not. If the principal can set this alert in a timely manner, then regardless of the noisy information that the agents have, the unique rationalizable strategy is to wait for the alert and not to exit if the alert is not triggered. This policy completely eliminates the panic.

(日期:2018-11-21 作者: 来源:)