论文标题：Optimal mixed ownership: a contract view

　　发表时间：2019

　　论文所有作者：Zheng Wang, John S. Heywood, Guangliang Ye

　　期刊名及所属分类：Journal of Economic Transition and Institutional Change(国际C)

　　英文摘要：This paper reconsiders the classic issue of whether provision of a public good should be undertaken directly by the government or through private contracting (Hart, Andrei, & Robert, 1997). We consider a third alternative of provision by a mixed ownership firm. We assume that this mixed ownership firm provides the government principal with a combination of the contracting problems it faces in the two more extreme alternatives. We show that full government ownership and provision is never optimal and that frequently the mixed firm undertakes intermediate investments that also prove welfare superior to fully private contracting. These results carry over to an extension in which the agent is presumed to be a foreigner.

　　中文摘要：本文重新思考了公共物品的提供是应该由政府直接承担还是通过私人承包承担这一经典问题(Hart, Andrei， & Robert, 1997)。我们考虑由混合所有权公司提供的第三种选择。我们假设这个混合所有制公司为政府的委托人提供了在两个更极端的替代方案中所面临的承包问题的组合。我们表明，完全的政府所有权和供应从来不是最优的，而且混合企业经常进行中间投资，也证明福利优于完全的私人承包。这些结果延伸到假定代理人是外国人的情况。