论文标题：On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium

　　发表时间：2019

　　论文所有作者：Qin, Cheng-Zhong and Yang, Xintong

　　期刊名及所属分类：Economic Theory(国际B)

　　英文摘要：A sequential variation of the Arrow–Debreu abstract economy is developed to closely capture the timing of moves of the Walrasian general equilibrium model. Instead of inducing a pseudo- game, the extensive form game of our sequential variation is well defined. It is shown that when information is symmetric, Walrasian equilibrium allocations are equivalent to subgame-perfect equilibrium allocations. When information is asymmetric, rational expectations equilibrium allocations are shown to be equivalent to perfect Bayesian equilibrium allocations. These results are useful for understanding and characterizing Walrasian and rational expectations equilibrium allocations.

　　中文摘要：本文提出了一个连续变化的阿罗-德布鲁抽象经济，以密切地捕捉瓦尔拉斯一般均衡模型的移动时间。我们的序列变异的广泛形式的博弈是很好的定义的，而不是诱导一个伪博弈。结果表明，当信息对称时，瓦尔拉斯均衡分配等价于子博弈-完全均衡分配。当信息不对称时，理性期望均衡分配等价于完美贝叶斯均衡分配。这些结果对于理解和刻画瓦尔拉斯均衡分配和理性期望均衡分配是有用的。