论文标题：Stock pledge, risk of losing control and corporate innovation

　　发表时间：2020

　　论文所有作者：Pang Caiji, Wang Ying

　　期刊名及所属分类：Journal of Corporate Finance(国际A)

　　英文摘要：This paper investigates the effects of stock pledge by controlling shareholder on corporate's future innovation productivity and the mechanism through which stock pledge affects innovation. We find that both the existence of stock pledge by controlling shareholder and the percentage of shares pledged by controlling shareholder are significantly negatively related to firms' future innovation outputs and quality, and these baseline results are robust to a variety of tests on sample selections, model specifications, and variable definitions. We further adopt several methodologies to address endogeneity concerns and establish a causal relationship between stock pledge by controlling shareholder and innovation. We then provide evidence to show that the impediment effect of stock pledge by controlling shareholder on innovation is possibly due to controlling shareholder's fear of losing corporate control in case of innovation failure. Finally, we find that although stock pledge is a possible channel to relieve a firm's financial constraint, it does not encourage the firm to invest more in innovation.

　　中文摘要：本文探讨了控股股东股权质押对公司未来创新生产力的影响以及股权质押影响创新的机制。我们发现股票质押的存在控股股东和控股股东质押股票的比例显著负相关,公司的未来创新输出和质量,这些基线结果是健壮的各种测试样本的选择、模型的规范,和变量定义。我们进一步采用几种方法来解决内生性问题，并建立控股股东股票质押与创新之间的因果关系。实证结果表明，控股股东股权质押对创新的阻碍作用可能是由于控股股东害怕在创新失败时失去对公司的控制。最后，我们发现股票质押虽然是一个可能的缓解企业财务约束的渠道，但它并不鼓励企业更多地投资于创新。