论文标题：Net Share Issurance and Asset Growth Effects: The Role of Managerial Incentives

　　发表时间：2020

　　论文所有作者：Wang Zhao

　　期刊名及所属分类：Financial Analysts Journal(国际B)

　　英文摘要：In the presence of asymmetric information, managerial equity incentives mitigate company managers’ empire-building motives while increasing their market_x0002_timing motives. If the market Under reacts to these motives, the negative return predict ability by net share issuance (NSI) and asset growth (AG) should be more pronounced among stocks with, respectively, larger managerial equity incentives and smaller managerial equity incentives. Our evidence supports this prediction. A hybrid strategy that exploited the NSI and AG effects in different groups of stocks screened by managerial equity incentives attained significant alphas after transaction costs, even after we controlled for the investment and profitability factors known to attenuate the two effects.

　　中文摘要：在信息不对称的情况下，管理层股权激励减弱了公司管理者的帝国建立动机，同时增加了他们的市场时机动机。如果市场对这些动机做出反应，则管理层股权激励较大的股票和管理层股权激励较小的股票，其净发行股票(NSI)和资产增长(AG)的负回报预测能力更显著。我们的证据支持这一预测。在经管理层股权激励筛选的不同组股票中，利用NSI和AG效应的混合策略在交易成本后获得了显著的alpha值，即使我们控制了已知可削弱这两种效应的投资和盈利因素。