论文标题：CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives and earnings guidance

　　发表时间：2020

　　论文所有作者：Wang Zhao

　　期刊名及所属分类：Applied Economics Letters(国际SSCI or SCI)

　　英文摘要：Extending recent studies on chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs), we investigate the impact of CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives on earnings guidance. We find that firms with high CEO risk-taking incentives are more likely to issue earnings guidance and issue more guidance. We also find that firms with high CFO risk-taking incentives are associated with less precise guidance, narrower forecast range, and earlier forecasts.

　　中文摘要：摘要本文结合近年来关于首席执行官(CEO)和首席财务官(CFO)的研究，考察了首席执行官和首席财务官的风险激励对盈余披露的影响。我们发现，具有较高CEO风险激励的公司更有可能发布收益指引，并发布更多的指引。我们还发现，财务总监承担风险激励较高的公司，其指导不准确，预测范围较窄，预测较早。