论文标题：Delivered pricing and endogenous delegation of contract type

　　发表时间：2020

　　论文所有作者：John S. Heywood, Zheng Wang

　　期刊名及所属分类：Australian Economic Papers(国际SSCI or SCI)

　　英文摘要：This article demonstrates for the first time that owners will delegate the location decision under delivered pricing using a relative performance contract rather than a market share contract. It goes on to evaluate the welfare consequences of this demonstration. With linear production costs and simultaneous location, both incentive contracts reduce welfare, but the chosen relative performance contract reduces it by less. Yet, with linear costs and sequential location, the chosen relative performance contract reduces welfare by more. Finally, with enough convexity in production costs, welfare can be improved by the chosen relative performance contracts.

　　中文摘要：本文首次论证了业主将在交付定价下使用相对绩效合同而不是市场份额合同委托地点决策。它继续评估这个演示的福利后果。在生产成本呈线性且同时选址的情况下，两种激励合同都会降低福利，但选择的相对绩效合同对福利的影响较小。然而，在线性成本和顺序位置的情况下，所选择的相对绩效合同对福利的影响更大。最后，在生产成本有足够凸度的情况下，选择相对绩效合同来改善福利车。