论文标题：Centralized Assignment Mechanisms and Assortative Matching: Evidence from Chinese Universities

　　发表时间：202009

　　论文所有作者：Yuan Cao

　　期刊名及所属分类：Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization(国际A-)

　　英文摘要：Student-college academic mismatch has been documented in the literature. This study takes advantage of a unique large-scale policy experiment in China in 2013 in which a variant of the Boston mechanism was replaced with a variant of the deferred acceptance mechanism and compares the quality of assortative matching between student test scores and college quality under the two mechanisms. College admission in China is performed via a centralized matching process based only on one national standardized test. Using administrative data from one province, I find that the restricted deferred acceptance reduces the number of over-matched students (low-scoring students attending high-quality colleges) by 7.1 percentage points (or 51.9%). However, on average, it increases the number of under-matched students (high-scoring students attending low-quality colleges) by 2.7 percentage points (or 12.8%) for those at the top tier based on test score distribution. Moreover, the effects are mainly experienced by students at the bottom 50% of the top tier. The increase in under-matched shares fades over time for men, but persists for women.

　　中文摘要：生与学院的学术不匹配已经在文献中得到了记录。本研究利用2013年在中国进行的一项独特的大规模政策实验，将波士顿机制的一个变体替换为延迟录取机制的一个变体，比较了两种机制下学生考试成绩和大学质量的协调性匹配质量。中国的大学录取是通过一个集中的匹配过程，仅基于一个国家标准化考试。使用一个省的行政数据，我发现限制延期录取使超生(进入高质量大学的低分学生)的数量减少了7.1个百分点(51.9%)。然而，根据考试成绩分布，它平均为那些顶尖大学的学生增加了2.7个百分点(或12.8%)的不匹配学生(高分学生进入低质量大学)。此外，受影响的主要是处于顶层的50%以下的学生。对于男性来说，比例不足的情况会随着时间的推移逐渐消失，但对于女性来说，这种情况会持续下去。