论文标题：Profitable Collusion on Costs: A Spatial Model

　　发表时间：2020.07

　　论文所有作者：John S. Heywood, Zheng Wang

　　期刊名及所属分类：Journal of Economics(国际B)

　　英文摘要：This paper uniquely demonstrates the scope for profitable collusion on transport costs under delivered pricing. In addition to being profitable, such collusion is shown to be more stable than price collusion and harder to detect as it presents to authorities as continued Bertrand price competition. Such collusion generates endogenous duopoly locations outside the quartiles with less stable but more profitable collusion happening toward the endpoints. These results emerge in both the traditional model of inelastic demand and an extended model of elastic demand.

　　中文摘要：本文独特地论证了配送定价下运输成本的合谋获利范围。除了有利可图之外，这种合谋被证明比价格合谋更稳定，并且更难被发现，因为它呈现给当局持续的Bertrand价格竞争。这种合谋在四分位数之外产生内生的双寡头位置，在端点处发生的合谋不太稳定，但更有利可图。这些结果在传统的非弹性需求模型和扩展的弹性需求模型中都有体现。