研究生workshop由首都经济贸易大学国际经济管理学院主办。主要内容：一是研究生报告前沿或经典文献，二是研究生报告自己的研究或研究设想。论坛宗旨是：为学院师生搭建一个学术交流平台，营造浓厚学术氛围；通过对经典论著或前沿文献的研讨，拓宽研究生的理论视野，提升研究生的前沿方法运用能力，帮助研究生提高论文写作质量。

　　

本期workshop

 

报告人：贾欣悦（博士一年级）

导师：庞蔡吉、张正宜、马庆寅

报告题目：《Partial adjustment toward target capital structures》，Journal of Financial Economics，2006

　　

报告摘要：

　　The empirical literature provides conflicting assessments about how firms choose their capital structures. Distinguishing among the three main hypotheses (“tradeoff”, pecking order, and market timing) requires that we know whether firms have long-run leverage targets and (if so) how quickly they adjust toward them. Yet many previous researchers have applied empirical specifications that fail to recognize the potential for incomplete adjustment. A more general, partial-adjustment model of firm leverage indicates that firms do have target capital structures. The typical firm closes about one-third of the gap between its actual and its target debt ratios each year.

　　实证文献提供了关于企业如何选择其资本结构的冲突评估。要区分三个主要假设（"权衡"、"择时"和市场时机），需要我们知道企业是否有长期杠杆目标，以及（如果有）它们如何快速调整朝向这些目标。然而，许多先前的研究者应用了未能认识到不完全调整可能性的实证规范。一种更一般的部分调整模型表明，企业确实有目标的资本结构。典型企业每年约能够缩小实际与目标债务比率之间约三分之一的差距。

　　

报告人：杜迎雪（博士一年级）

导师：张正宜，庞蔡吉，马庆寅

报告题目：《Law and Finance》，Journal of Political Economy， 1998

报告摘要：

　　This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common-law countries generally have the strongest, and French civil-law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil-law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.

　　本文研究了覆盖公司股东和债权人保护的法律规则，这些规则的起源以及它们在49个国家中的执行质量。结果显示，普遍情况下，普通法国家通常拥有最强的投资者法律保护，而法国民法国家拥有最薄弱的保护，而德国和斯堪的纳维亚法国家位于中间。我们还发现，最大的上市公司股份的所有权集中与投资者的保护之间存在负相关关系，与这一假设一致，即在不保护其权利的国家中，小股东不太可能起到重要作用。