Speaker: Dr. 宋阳波 (Yangbo Song)

Title: Network-Based Peer Monitoring Design

Schedule: March 6, Wed 3:30-5:00 PM

Location: 诚明楼 (Chengming Hall) RM315

Introduction: 宋阳波,于加州大学洛杉矶分校获经济学博士,现任香港中文大学(深圳)经管学院副教授。主要研究方向包括博弈论、信息经济学、网络经济学等，论文见于 Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Economic Theory 等国际一流经济学期刊。主持完成一项国家自然科学基金青年基金项目，参与一项国家自然科学基金重大项目，兼任中国运筹学会博弈论分会青年理事。

Abstract: We study a team incentive design problem where multiple agents are located on a network and work on a joint project. The principal seeks the least costly mechanism to incentivize full efforts, by choosing the work assignment sequence and the rewards to the agents upon success. Whereas the agents’ actions are hidden to the principal, they may be observed among the agents given the internal information that is determined by the network and the sequence. Under effort complementarity, the transparency of the agents’ actions can reduce their incentive costs but with decreasing marginal effectiveness. For several typical network topologies, we derive explicit properties of an optimal assignment sequence, and propose a number of measures to rank networks in terms of total cost and stability.