Speaker: Dr. 李江涛 (Jiangtao Li)

Title: Undominated Mechanisms

Schedule: Jan 3, 13:30-15:00 PM

Location: 诚明楼 (Chengming Hall), Rm 315

Introduction: 李江涛，新加坡管理大学经济学院副教授，主要研究领域为机制设计。研究成果发表于Econometrica、Journal of Economic Theory、Games and Economic Behavior。担任 Journal of Mathematical Economics、Mathematical Social Sciences、International Journal of Economic Theory 副主编。

Abstract: We study the design of mechanisms when the designer faces multiple plausible scenarios and is uncertain about the true scenario. A mechanism is dominated by another if the latter performs at least as well in all plausible scenarios and strictly better in at least one. A mechanism is undominated if no other feasible mechanism dominates it. We show how analyzing undominated mechanisms could be useful and illustrate the tractability of characterizing such mechanisms. This approach provides an alternative criterion for mechanism design under non-Bayesian uncertainty, complementing existing methods.