Title：Underwriting Syndicate Size and Diversity and Foreign IPO Underpricing: A Multiple Agency Perspective

　　Schedule：Dec 15, Wed 12-1 PM　

　　Location：诚明楼 315 & 腾讯会议 802 607 975

　　Abstract：Grounded in agency theory, we investigate the effect of underwriting syndicate size and diversity on underpricing for 343 foreign IPOs from January 2009 through December 2019. We provide strong evidence that underpricing is higher for IPOs underwritten by large and diverse syndicates due to free-riding and moral hazard issues among syndicate members. We also find that the frequency of foreign IPOs by home country firms and the home country legal protection of investors can mitigate agency risks surrounding underwriting syndicates, thereby weakening the negative effect of large syndicates on the foreign IPO outcome. By elaborately analyzing the multiple agency relationships with conflicting voices faced by investment banks at the IPO stage, this study gains insights into the implication of size and diversity on underwriting syndicate performance as well as country-level factors that can limit opportunistic behavior of syndicate members in the context of foreign IPOs, and thus contribute to the foreign IPO literature.

标题：承销商规模、多元化与跨国 IPO 抑价：多机构视角

摘要：以代理理论为基础，我们考察了2009年1月至2019年12月期间承销商规模和多样性对343宗跨国IPO抑价的影响。我们提供了强有力的证据，证明由于成员之间的搭便车和道德风险问题，承销商规模大、多元化高的 IPO 抑价更高。我们还发现，母国公司在外国 IPO 的频率和对投资者的母国法律保护可以减轻围绕承销团的代理风险，从而削弱大型财团对外国 IPO 结果的负面影响。通过详细分析投资银行在 IPO 阶段面临的多重代理关系和相互冲突，本研究深入了解承销商规模和多样性对承销业绩的影响，以及限制承销团队成员投机行为的国家层面因素，从而为跨国 IPO文献做出贡献。

 

Introduction：申芷菡，博士毕业于伦敦大学卡斯商学院，现任首都经济贸易大学国际经济管理学院助理教授。申芷菡的研究领域主要为：公司治理、创业融资、和跨国并购等。申芷菡曾多次在AOM,AIB,SMS等国际管理学会议上报告论文，并获得美国管理学学会2020年度最佳论文奖。