Title：Minimum Wage, State Ownership, and Industrial Pollution

　　Schedule: Dec 29, Wed 12-1 PM　　

　　Location: 诚明楼 315 & 腾讯会议 363 914 805

　　Abstract：Using the establishment-level pollution emission data of Chinese industrial firms, we document firms' trade-offs between pollution abatement costs and the increase in labor costs. Exploring minimum wage policy discontinuity at county border, we find that minimum wage hikes increase firms' pollution emissions and reduce their abatement efforts. State ownership mitigates the negative impact of minimum wages on pollution emissions, suggesting the role of SOEs in dealing with externality. The effects of minimum wage on pollution releases are stronger for firms with financial constraints, lower product market power, higher labor intensities, and lower environmental pressure. Overall, our findings highlight the unintended environmental consequences of minimum wages.

标题：最低工资、国家所有制和工业污染

摘要：利用中国工业企业的企业级污染排放数据，我们记录了企业在污染减排成本和劳动力成本增加之间的权衡。探索县界最低工资政策的不连续性，我们发现提高最低工资会增加企业的污染排放并降低他们的减排努力。国有制减轻了最低工资对污染排放的负面影响，表明了国有企业在应对外部性方面的作用。对于财务受限、产品市场支配力较低、劳动强度较高和环境压力较小的公司，最低工资对污染排放的影响更大。总体而言，我们的研究结果突出了最低工资对环境的意外影响。

 

Introduction：邹昆儒，金融学博士，2021年毕业于南洋理工大学。中国人民大学财政金融学院，讲师。主要研究领域为公司金融、金融中介、企业社会责任。