题目：Timely Persuation
报告人：周臻 （清华大学五道口金融学院教授）
报告时间：2018年11月28日（周三） 14：00 pm
地点：国际经管学院会议室（诚明楼三层）
主办方：国际经济管理学院

摘要：Upon arrival of a shock, agents get a short time window to exit. There is strategic complementarity in exiting while delayed exiting is costly. The arrival of the shock is publicly known but agents do not know the intensity of it perfectly. This could generate a panic - the agents choosing to exit even when the fundamental is not extremely bad (under which all agents should exit). There is a principal who, unlike the agents, can see the intensity of the shock and how many agents are exiting. To minimize the incidence of panic, what information should she disclose? We propose a simple information disclosure policy. At some date, the principal publicly sends a disaster alert that confirms whether exiting has become the dominant strategy or not. If the principal can set this alert in a timely manner, then regardless of the noisy information that the agents have, the unique rationalizable strategy is to wait for the alert and not to exit if the alert is not triggered. This policy completely eliminates the panic.

摘要：当受到一定冲击后，代理人有一个很短的时间窗口退出。退出具有战略互补性，而延迟退出代价高昂。冲击的到来是众所周知的，但代理人并不完全了解冲击的强度。这可能会产生恐慌——即使基本面不是非常糟糕（所有代理都应该退出），代理也会选择退出。有一个委托人，与代理人不同，他可以看到冲击的强度以及有多少代理人正在退出。为了尽量减少恐慌的发生，她应该披露哪些信息？我们提出了一个简单的信息披露政策框架。在某个日期，委托人公开发送灾难警报，确认退出是否已成为主导策略。如果委托人能够及时设置此警报，那么无论代理人拥有的嘈杂信息如何，唯一的合理化策略是等待警报，如果没有触发警报则不退出。这一政策可以彻底消除恐慌。